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downs an economic theory of democracy: An Economic Theory of Democracy Anthony Downs, 1957 This book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Information, Participation, and Choice Bernard Grofman, 1993 A review of the consequences for political science of Anthony Downs's seminal work. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy Brian Barry, 1988-09-15 Rationalist theories of political behavior have recently risen in status to that of a new—or, more accurately, rediscovered—paradigm in the systematic study of politics. Brian Barry's short, provocative book played no small part in the debate that precipitated this shift. . . . Without reservation, Barry's treatise is the most lucid and most influential critique of two important, competing perspectives in political analysis: the 'sociological' school of Talcott Parsons, Gabriel Almond, and other so-called functionalists; and the 'economic' school of Anthony Downs and Mancur Olson, among others.—Dennis J. Encarnation, American Journal of Sociology |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Formal Models of Domestic Politics Scott Gehlbach, 2021-09-30 An accessible treatment of important formal models of domestic politics, fully updated and now including a chapter on nondemocracy. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Using Surveys to Value Public Goods Robert Cameron Mitchell, Richard T. Carson, 1989 Provides decision makers, policy analysts, and social scientists, with a detailed discussion of a new techniques for the valuation of goods not traded in prevate markets. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: A Preface to Democratic Theory Robert A. Dahl, 1956 Robert Dahl's Preface helped launch democratic theory fifty years ago as a new area of study in political science, and it remains the standard introduction to the field. Exploring problems that had been left unsolved by traditional thought on democracy, Dahl here examines two influential models--the Madisonian, which represents prevailing American doctrine, and its recurring challenger, populist theory--arguing that they do not accurately portray how modern democracies operate. He then constructs a model more consistent with how contemporary democracies actually function, and, in doing so, develops some original views of popular sovereignty and the American constitutional system. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Performance Politics and the British Voter Harold D. Clarke, 2009-07-23 Shows that judgment of party competence is at the heart of electoral choice in contemporary Britain. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Against Democracy Jason Brennan, 2017-09-26 A bracingly provocative challenge to one of our most cherished ideas and institutions Most people believe democracy is a uniquely just form of government. They believe people have the right to an equal share of political power. And they believe that political participation is good for us—it empowers us, helps us get what we want, and tends to make us smarter, more virtuous, and more caring for one another. These are some of our most cherished ideas about democracy. But Jason Brennan says they are all wrong. In this trenchant book, Brennan argues that democracy should be judged by its results—and the results are not good enough. Just as defendants have a right to a fair trial, citizens have a right to competent government. But democracy is the rule of the ignorant and the irrational, and it all too often falls short. Furthermore, no one has a fundamental right to any share of political power, and exercising political power does most of us little good. On the contrary, a wide range of social science research shows that political participation and democratic deliberation actually tend to make people worse—more irrational, biased, and mean. Given this grim picture, Brennan argues that a new system of government—epistocracy, the rule of the knowledgeable—may be better than democracy, and that it's time to experiment and find out. A challenging critique of democracy and the first sustained defense of the rule of the knowledgeable, Against Democracy is essential reading for scholars and students of politics across the disciplines. Featuring a new preface that situates the book within the current political climate and discusses other alternatives beyond epistocracy, Against Democracy is a challenging critique of democracy and the first sustained defense of the rule of the knowledgeable. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Calculus of Consent James M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, 1965 A scientific study of the political and economic factors influencing democratic decision making |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Free to Move Ilya Somin, 2020-04-23 Ballot box voting is often considered the essence of political freedom. But it has two major shortcomings: individual voters have little chance of making a difference, and they face strong incentives to remain ignorant about the issues at stake. Voting with your feet, however, avoids both these pitfalls and offers a wider range of choices. In Free to Move, Ilya Somin explains how broadening opportunities for foot voting can greatly enhance political liberty for millions of people around the world. People can vote with their feet through international migration, choosing where to live within a federal system, and by making decisions in the private sector. Somin addresses a variety of common objections to expanded migration rights, including claims that the self-determination of natives requires giving them the power to exclude migrants, and arguments that migration is likely to have harmful side effects, such as undermining political institutions, overburdening the welfare state, increasing crime and terrorism, and spreading undesirable cultural values. While these objections are usually directed at international migration, Somin shows how a consistent commitment to such theories would also justify severe restrictions on domestic freedom of movement. By making a systematic case for a more open world, Free to Move challenges conventional wisdom on both the left and the right. This revised and expanded edition addresses key new issues, including fears that migration could spread dangerous diseases, such as Covid-19, claims that immigrants might generate a political backlash that threatens democracy, and the impact of remote work. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Political Competition John E ROEMER, John E Roemer, 2009-06-30 John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties and he models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory Donald Green, Ian Shapiro, 1994-09-28 This is the first comprehensive critical evaluation of the use of rational choice theory in political science. Writing in an accessible and nontechnical style, Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro assess rational choice theory where it is reputed to be most successful: the study of collective action, the behavior of political parties and politicians, and such phenomena as voting cycles and Prisoner's Dilemmas. In their hard-hitting critique, Green and Shapiro demonstrate that the much heralded achievements of rational choice theory are in fact deeply suspect and that fundamental rethinking is needed if rational choice theorists are to contribute to the understanding of politics. In their final chapters, they anticipate and respond to a variety of possible rational choice responses to their arguments, thereby initiating a dialogue that is bound to continue for some time. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: A Behavioral Theory of Elections Jonathan Bendor, 2011-02-06 Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. This title provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors - politicians as well as voters - are only boundedly rational. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: After War Christopher J. Coyne, 2008 Post-conflict reconstruction is one of the most pressing political issues today. This book uses economics to analyze critically the incentives and constraints faced by various actors involved in reconstruction efforts. Through this analysis, the book will aid in understanding why some reconstructions are more successful than others. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Political Capitalism Randall G. Holcombe, 2018-07-19 Explains why government policies favor elites over the masses, building on well-established theories from the social sciences. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Voting Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, William N. McPhee, 1986-06-15 Voting is an examination of the factors that make people vote the way they do. Based on the famous Elmira Study, carried out by a team of skilled social scientists during the 1948 presidential campaign, it shows how voting is affected by social class, religious background, family loyalties, on-the-job relationships, local pressure groups, mass communication media, and other factors. Still highly relevant, Voting is one of the most frequently cited books in the field of voting behavior. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Preferences and Democracy Albert Breton, 1993-03-31 Villa Colombella Papers |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion John Zaller, 1992-08-28 This 1992 book explains how people acquire political information from elites and the mass media and convert it into political preferences. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Political Economy of Democracy and Tyranny Norman Schofield, 2009 One theme that has emerged from the recent literature on political economy concerns the transition to democracy: why would dominant elites give up oligarchic power? This book addresses the fundamental question of democratic stability and the collapse of tyranny by considering a formal model of democracy and tyranny. The formal model is used to study elections in developed polities such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and Israel, as well as complex developing polities such as Turkey. The key idea is that activist groups may offer resources to political candidates if they in turn adjust their polities in favor of the interest group. In polities that use a first past the post electoral system, such as the US, the bargaining between interest groups and candidates creates a tendency for activist groups to coalesce; in polities such as Israel and the Netherlands, where the electoral system is very proportional, there may be little tendency for activist coalescence. A further feature of the model is that candidates, or political leaders, like Barack Obama, with high intrinsic charisma, or valence, will be attracted to the electoral center, while less charismatic leaders will move to the electoral periphery. This aspect of the model is used to compare the position taking and exercise of power of authoritarian leaders in Portugal, Argentina and the Soviet Union. The final chapter of the book suggests that the chaos that may be induced by climate change and rapid population growth can only be addressed by concerted action directed by a charismatic leader of the Atlantic democracies. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Two Majorities Byron E. Shafer, William J.M. Claggett, 1995-07-25 Why do Democratic political candidates avoid the one issue on which the general public is most in agreement with them? Why do Republicans consistently raise the one issue their advisors urge them to avoid? Why do voters so often exhibit patterns of policy preference vastly different from what analysts and strategists predict? And why do these same voters consistently cast ballots that ensure the continuation of divided government? In The Two Majorities Byron Shafer and William Claggett offer groundbreaking political analysis that resolves many of the seeming contradictions in the contemporary American political scene. Drawing on an unusually large sample of all Americans, taken by the Gallup organization, Shafer and Claggett argue that the recent turbulence in American politics is in some ways superficial. Below the surface, they contend, the political preferences of the American people remain remarkably stable. Shafer and Claggett find that American public opinion is organized around two clusters of issues—both of which are favored by a majority if voters: social welfare, social insurance, and civil rights, which constitute an economic/welfare factor (associated with Democrats), and cultural values, civil liberties, and foreign relations, a cultural/national factor (associated with Republicans). Provocatively, the authors argue that each party's best strategy for success is not to try to take popular positions on the whole range of issues, but to focus attention on the party's most successful cluster of issues. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy Charles Rowley, Friedrich Schneider, 2008-08-09 Public choice is the study of behavior at the intersection of economics and political science. Since the pioneering work of Duncan Black in the 1940s, public choice has developed a rich literature, drawing from such related perspectives as history, philosophy, law, and sociology, to analyze political decision making (by citizen-voters, elected officials, bureaucratic administrators, lobbyists, and other rational actors) in social and economic context, with an emphasis on identifying differences between individual goals and collective outcomes. Constitutional political economy provides important insights into the relationship between effective constitutions and the behavior of ordinary political markets. In Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider have assembled an international array of leading authors to present a comprehensive and accessible overview of the field and its applications. Covering a wide array of topics, including regulation and antitrust, taxation, trade liberalization, political corruption, interest group behavior, dictatorship, and environmental issues, and featuring biographies of the founding fathers of the field, this volume will be essential reading for scholars and students, policymakers, economists, sociologists, and non-specialist readers interested in the dynamics of political economy. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Computer Simulations of Voting Behavior William R. Shaffer, 1972 |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Liberalism Jan Narveson, Susan Dimock, Susan Whitney Dimock, 2000-12-31 No theory is more passionately and widely defined, or decried, than is liberalism in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. But what is this theory, on which so much ink is spilled? This collection of original essays by leading specialists in political philosophy, legal theory, and economics offers answers to that question, by exploring the theoretical commitments of liberals and some of the practical implications of their view. Among the topics explored is the distinction between liberalism and conservatism, and the degree to which liberals must be committed to neutrality, individualism, equality, freedom, and a contractarian theory of justification. The practical implications of liberalism are further examined by considerations of the proper role of the liberal state in undertaking egalitarian redistribution, the provision of public goods, and retributive punishment. The papers assembled by Narveson and Dimock will be of benefit to anyone working in the areas of political philosophy, political theory, or political economics. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Economic Fictions Paul K. Crosser, 1957 |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Democracy and Political Ignorance Ilya Somin, 2013-10-02 One of the biggest problems with modern democracy is that most of the public is usually ignorant of politics and government. Often, many people understand that their votes are unlikely to change the outcome of an election and don't see the point in learning much about politics. This may be rational, but it creates a nation of people with little political knowledge and little ability to objectively evaluate what they do know. In Democracy and Political Ignorance, Ilya Somin mines the depths of ignorance in America and reveals the extent to which it is a major problem for democracy. Somin weighs various options for solving this problem, arguing that political ignorance is best mitigated and its effects lessened by decentralizing and limiting government. Somin provocatively argues that people make better decisions when they choose what to purchase in the market or which state or local government to live under, than when they vote at the ballot box, because they have stronger incentives to acquire relevant information and to use it wisely. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Decline and Rise of Democracy David Stasavage, 2020-06-02 One of the most important books on political regimes written in a generation.—Steven Levitsky, New York Times–bestselling author of How Democracies Die A new understanding of how and why early democracy took hold, how modern democracy evolved, and what this history teaches us about the future Historical accounts of democracy’s rise tend to focus on ancient Greece and pre-Renaissance Europe. The Decline and Rise of Democracy draws from global evidence to show that the story is much richer—democratic practices were present in many places, at many other times, from the Americas before European conquest, to ancient Mesopotamia, to precolonial Africa. Delving into the prevalence of early democracy throughout the world, David Stasavage makes the case that understanding how and where these democracies flourished—and when and why they declined—can provide crucial information not just about the history of governance, but also about the ways modern democracies work and where they could manifest in the future. Drawing from examples spanning several millennia, Stasavage first considers why states developed either democratic or autocratic styles of governance and argues that early democracy tended to develop in small places with a weak state and, counterintuitively, simple technologies. When central state institutions (such as a tax bureaucracy) were absent—as in medieval Europe—rulers needed consent from their populace to govern. When central institutions were strong—as in China or the Middle East—consent was less necessary and autocracy more likely. He then explores the transition from early to modern democracy, which first took shape in England and then the United States, illustrating that modern democracy arose as an effort to combine popular control with a strong state over a large territory. Democracy has been an experiment that has unfolded over time and across the world—and its transformation is ongoing. Amidst rising democratic anxieties, The Decline and Rise of Democracy widens the historical lens on the growth of political institutions and offers surprising lessons for all who care about governance. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Principles of Public Finance Hugh Dalton Baron Dalton, 1923 Substance of lectures on the theory of public finance delivered at the London School of Economics. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Economic Effects of Constitutions Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, 2005-01-14 The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the missing link between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice Melvin J. Hinich, Michael C. Munger, 1996-09-16 A pioneering effort to integrate ideology with formal political theory |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Setting the People Free John Dunn, 2005 Why does democracy, both as a word and an idea, linger so large in the political imagination today? John Dunn charts its slow but insistent metamorphosis from its roots in Ancient Greece to its overwhelming triumph in the years since 1945. Setting the People Free is an account of this extraordinary idea and its evolution. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Government and Markets Edward J. Balleisen, David A. Moss, 2010 After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory. Its essays by leading scholars move past predominant approaches, integrating the latest research about the interplay between human behavior, societal needs, and regulatory institutions. The book concludes by setting out a potential research agenda for the social sciences. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Stuck in Traffic Anthony Downs, 2000-07-26 A Brookings Institution Press and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy publication Peak-hour traffic congestion has become a major problem in most U.S. cities. In fact, a majority of residents in metropolitan and suburban areas consider congestion their most serious local problem. As citizens have become increasingly frustrated by repeated traffic delays that cost them money and waste time, congestion has become an important factor affecting local government policies in many parts of the nation. In this new book, Anthony Downs looks at the causes of worsening traffic congestion, especially in suburban areas, and considers the possible remedies. He analyzes the specific advantages and disadvantages of every major strategy that has been proposed to reduce congestion. In nontechnical language, he focuses on two central issues: the relationships between land-use and traffic flow in rapidly growing areas, and whether local policies can effectively reduce congestion or if more regional approaches are necessary. In rapidly growing parts of the country, congestion is worse than it was five or ten years ago. But Downs notes that the problem has apparently not yet become bad enough to stimulate effective responses. Neither government officials nor citizens seem willing to consider changing the behavior and public policies that cause congestion. To alleviate the problem, both groups must be prepared to make these fundamental changes. Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Book of 1992 |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Revolution in Real Estate Finance Anthony Downs, 1985 Analyzes the causes of the revolution in real estate finance and traces its many effects throughout real estate markets. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Dispossessed Ursula K. Le Guin, 2001 A brilliant physicist attempts to salvage his planet of anarchy. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy James M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, 1962 This is the second volume of Liberty Fund's The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, it is a reprint edition of the ground-breaking economic classic written by two of the world's preeminent economists -- Gordon Tullock and Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan. This book is a unique blend of economics and political science that helped create significant new subfields in each discipline respectively, namely, the public choice school and constitutional political economy. Charles K. Rowley, Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University, points out in his introduction, The Calculus of Consent is, by a wide margin, the most widely cited publication of each coauthor and, by general agreement, their most important scientific contribution. The book is divided into four parts, each consisting of several chapters. The introduction by Professor Rowley provides a short overview of the book and identifies key insights that permeated the bounds of economics and political science and created an enduring nexus between the two sciences.Part I establishes the conceptual framework of the book's subject; part II defines the realm of social choice; part III applies the logic developed in part II to describe a range of decision-making rules, most notably, the rule of simple majority; while part IV explores the economics and ethics of democracy. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Economics of Control Abba P. Lerner, 1946 |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Democracy and Development Adam Przeworski, 2000-08-28 Examines impact of political regimes on economic development between 1950 and 1990. |
downs an economic theory of democracy: The Theory of Economic Growth W. Arthur Lewis, 1970 |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Behavior Theory and Conditioning Kenneth Wartenbee Spence, 1956 |
downs an economic theory of democracy: Real Estate and the Financial Crisis Anthony Downs, Urban Land Institute, 2009 This book explains what happened and why and takes a look at the long-term consequences. Included are public policy responses and the role of the Federal Reserve; additional policy recommendations for the commercial real estate and housing sectors; scenarios for what may occur and what the impacts will be; and a discussion of the new financial era to come. --Book Jacket. |
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Elissa Downs | University of Minnesota Physicians
Elissa Downs, MD, MPH, is a gastroenterologist who cares for pediatric patients in need of liver and gastroenterology care, as well as patients with epidermolysis bullosa. Dr. Downs sees her …
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For children with Down syndrome, expert care from birth through childhood pays rewards down the road. The Down syndrome services at Children’s Minnesota provide the foundation these …
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Address. Pediatric Gastroenterology, Hepatology & Nutrition Academic Office Building 2450 Riverside Ave S AO-201 Minneapolis, MN 55454
Dr. Elissa M. Downs MD - US News Health
Dr. Elissa M. Downs is a pediatric gastroenterologist in Minneapolis, Minnesota and is affiliated with multiple hospitals in the area, including M Health Fairview Masonic Children's Hospital and...
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Elissa Downs, MD is a Pediatric Gastroenterologist in Minneapolis, MN and has 14 years experience. Dr.
Canterbury Park - Wikipedia
Canterbury Park (formerly Canterbury Downs), is a horse racing track in Shakopee, Minnesota, United States.
Bavaria Downs: A Dreamy Wedding Venue And Its Cost
Nov 1, 2024 · Located in Chaska, Minnesota, just 30 minutes from downtown Minneapolis, Bavaria Downs is a luxurious wedding venue that offers a unique and memorable experience …
Bavaria Downs | Top Wedding Venue in Minnesota
Bavaria Downs is home to three of the top wedding venues in Minnesota -The Edward Anne Estate, Equestria West, and Woodland Glasshaus. Our venues exude luxury and excellence. …
Elissa Downs , MD - M Health Fairview
Find information about and book an appointment with Dr. Elissa Downs, MD in Minneapolis, MN. Specialties: Pediatric Gastroenterology, Pediatric Transplant Hepatology.
DSAMn - Down Syndrome Association of Minnesota
Welcome, how can we help? Be the first to know about upcoming events and new info. Down Syndrome Association of Minnesota.
Elissa Downs | University of Minnesota Physicians
Elissa Downs, MD, MPH, is a gastroenterologist who cares for pediatric patients in need of liver and gastroenterology care, as well as patients with epidermolysis bullosa. Dr. Downs sees her …
Down Syndrome Care and Services | Children's Minnesota
For children with Down syndrome, expert care from birth through childhood pays rewards down the road. The Down syndrome services at Children’s Minnesota provide the foundation these …
Elissa Downs - Medical School
Address. Pediatric Gastroenterology, Hepatology & Nutrition Academic Office Building 2450 Riverside Ave S AO-201 Minneapolis, MN 55454
Dr. Elissa M. Downs MD - US News Health
Dr. Elissa M. Downs is a pediatric gastroenterologist in Minneapolis, Minnesota and is affiliated with multiple hospitals in the area, including M Health Fairview Masonic Children's Hospital and...
Dr. Elissa Downs, MD, Pediatric Gastroenterologist - Sharecare
Elissa Downs, MD is a Pediatric Gastroenterologist in Minneapolis, MN and has 14 years experience. Dr.
Canterbury Park - Wikipedia
Canterbury Park (formerly Canterbury Downs), is a horse racing track in Shakopee, Minnesota, United States.
Bavaria Downs: A Dreamy Wedding Venue And Its Cost
Nov 1, 2024 · Located in Chaska, Minnesota, just 30 minutes from downtown Minneapolis, Bavaria Downs is a luxurious wedding venue that offers a unique and memorable experience …